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Abstract
This paper describes the corpus of sockpuppet cases we gathered from Wikipedia. A sockpuppet is an online user account created with
a fake identity for the purpose of covering abusive behavior and/or subverting the editing regulation process. We used a semi-automated
method for crawling and curating a dataset of real sockpuppet investigation cases. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first corpus
available on real-world deceptive writing. We describe the process for crawling the data and some preliminary results that can be used
as baseline for benchmarking research. The dataset will be released under a Creative Commons license from our project website:
http://docsig.cis.uab.edu.
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1. Introduction
In Wikipedia, users can create multiple accounts for many
different purposes. According to Wikipedia’s policies, each
user is supposed to create only one user account. However,
Wikipedia does not enforce the one-user-one-account rule
through technical means. As a result, users are free to cre-
ate multiple accounts if they want to. A secondary account
created by a user for malicious purposes is called a sock-
puppet. This ease of creating an identity has led malicious
users to create multiple identities and use them for various
purposes, ranging from block evasion, false majority opin-
ion claims, and vote stacking.
One of the main applications of the sockpuppet dataset is
to develop an automated tool for sockpuppet detection in
Wikipedia. Currently, the process for detecting sockpup-
pets is manual and involves significant experience from the
administrators. In many cases, the user IP addresses have
to be accessed by special Wikipedia administrators with IP-
address viewing privileges (“checkusers”). This violates
user privacy. Without accessing the IP addresses, the ad-
ministrators need to depend on their experience in dealing
with sockpuppets to detect similarities in writing style and
behavior manually. That leaves a lot of room for error.
In contrast, an automated tool trained using our sockpup-
pet dataset can be used to identify the sockpuppets with-
out requiring IP address information or expert administrator
knowledge. In practice, the automated tool can be used to
assist administrators to more accurately identify malicious
sockpuppets.
Besides the use in development of tools for automated de-
tection of sockpuppets in Wikipedia, the sockpuppet dataset
has many other potential applications. In particular, this
corpus can be used by researchers working on authorship
attribution problems. The sockpuppet corpus provides a
real world data set of short messages from real malicious
users. The sockpuppet cases involve text from actual users
who are intentionally creating multiple identities and ac-
tively trying to hide their connections to the sockpuppet
master. Therefore, using this corpus, researchers can test
their work in a real life setting. This type of authorship
attribution of short text has potential applications in iden-
tifying terrorists in web forums, online discussion boards,
phone text messages, tweets and other social media inter-
actions where comments and text tend to be brief and short
in length.
2. Related Work
Authorship analysis has received a great deal of attention
in recent years (Stamatatos, 2008). The field has grown
from a pure manual stylistic analysis to machine learning
approaches that combine stylistic features with richer rep-
resentations of writing preferences, such as n-grams of syn-
tactic features (Sidorov et al., 2013) and local histograms
of character n-grams (Escalante et al., 2011). Recent work
started exploring the limits of automated approaches to the
problem of authorship analysis by looking at extremely
short documents (Layton et al., 2010), very large candi-
date sets (Koppel et al., 2011), and cross-domain scenarios
(Goldstein-Stewart et al., 2008).
Less work has been devoted to authorship analysis on de-
ceptive writing. Some of the exceptions include the work
in (Brennan et al., 2012; Novak et al., 2004). The main
barrier to study attribution in adversarial scenarios is the
lack of suitable data. This is understandable as the nature
of the problem makes it difficult to have readily available
data where subjects have been intentionally trying to de-
ceive humans. To solve this barrier researchers have turn to
the generation of artificial data sets. For instance Novak et
al. generated sub aliases from message boards by randomly
splitting data from the same alias (Novak et al., 2004). Then
they evaluated performance of their method on linking the
two sub aliases. The Brennan-Greenstadt adversarial sty-
lometry corpus was collected from volunteers (Brennan et
al., 2012). The authors instructed the subjects to submit
original writings of an academic nature. Then the subjects
were asked to obfuscate their writing style during the cre-
ation of a topic specific writing of 500 words. In addition,
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subjects were also requested to submit an imitation writing
excerpt, where they were instructed to imitate the writing of
Cormac McCarthy in The Road. Here again, the topic of the
imitation writing was controlled by the corpus developers.
Both resources are valuable in that they enabled researchers
to explore attribution approaches and allowed them to show
that in adversarial scenarios state of the art approaches will
degrade performance. This gap in performance calls for
more research in deceptive writing. However, these two
data sets still have an artificial flavor to them since the au-
thors were not self motivated and it is not clear whether this
will cause major differences in the final stylistic markers of
their writings. The sockpuppet corpus we created is a real-
world alternative to the study of deceptive writing in social
media. The authors were not aware of someone collecting
their writings to study attribution, thus this new data set will
allow the study of deceptive writing in the wild.
3. Sockpuppet Investigations (SPI) in
Wikipedia
Wikipedia allows any editor to request investigation of sus-
pected sockpuppetry. The requester needs to include any
evidence of the abusive behavior. Typical evidence includes
information about the editing patterns related to those ac-
counts, such as the articles, the topics, vandalism patterns,
timing of account creation, timing of edits, and voting pat-
tern in disagreements.
Once a case is filed, an administrator will investigate the
case. An administrator is an editor with privileges to make
account management decisions, such as banning an editor.
The administrator performs a behavioral evidence investi-
gation and will try to determine whether the two accounts
are related and will then issue a decision confirming or re-
jecting the sockpuppetry case, or request involvement of a
check user. Check users are higher privileged editors, who
have access to private information regarding editors and ed-
its, such as the IP address from which an editor has logged
in. Check users perform a technical evidence investigation.
But as explained in Wikipedia SPI description, these users
will be involved in the investigation, if needed, only after
strong behavioral evidence has been collected.
When an SPI concludes with a confirmed sock puppetry
verdict, the sockpuppet account will be banned indefinitely.
The administrators have the discretion to establish bans or
to block the main account as well.
The process to resolve SPI described above is time consum-
ing and expensive. The last time we checked the list of cur-
rent cases, on 10/23/13, there were 30+ unique SPI cases
listed for the month of October. This high rate of cases filed
in a single month show the need for a streamlined process
to handle SPIs. The data set we created is a first step on this
direction.
4. Data Collection Process
All the data we collected from Wikipedia is readily avail-
able from the Wikipedia website. Wikipedia archives all in-
formation related to each sockpuppet case filed, and once a
verdict is issued, that too is stored in the archives. However,
because of the lack of a standard format in the archives, our
process for data collection is semi-automated. The sock-
puppet cases we collected were crawled from the following
urls:
• https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Wikipedia:Sockpuppet_
investigations/SPI/Closed/2009
• https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Wikipedia:Sockpuppet_
investigations/SPI/Closed/2010
• http://en.wikipedia.org/w/
index.php?title=Wikipedia:
Sockpuppet_investigations/Cases/
Overview&offset=&limit=500&action=
history
For each case selected for addition to our corpus we col-
lect all data from the talk pages of each editor involved in
the SPI case. This step is done automatically by crawling
the corresponding Wikipedia archives. We only collect data
from discussion pages since these are free form discussions
among editors that give editors more freedom to show their
stylistic writing markers. In contrast, the basic namespaces
in Wikipedia, and in particular the articles the editors con-
tribute to, have a more restrictive format that can make dif-
ficult the identification of editors. Moreover, some of the
edits in the main Wikipedia articles include things like re-
verts, or typo corrections, that are related to the user behav-
ior and not necessarily to editors writing styles. Our main
goal to develop this corpus is to support research in decep-
tive writing, and thus the behavior treats mentioned above
fall outside this goal. However, this information could still
be crawled at a later stage and be leveraged to perform a
persona identification.
The manual process for this task involves retrieving the fi-
nal decision reached by the investigative administrator or
check user. There is no fixed format for recording decisions
on SPI cases and therefore parsing the data with regular ex-
pressions will not work for most cases. We were required to
visit each SPI case and read the discussion of any adminis-
trators investigating the case and check users involved. This
was the bottle neck for the process and what prevented us
from having a larger sample. Although we continue to add
cases to our data set as feasible.
The majority of the SPI cases in Wikipedia end up being
confirmed as sock puppets. This is reasonable since editors
file cases after they have already seen some suspicious be-
havior. Therefore, to provide a larger number of non-sock
puppet cases, we crawled pairs of editors that have not been
involved in SPI before but that have participated in the same
talk pages as editors involved in SPI cases.
5. The Sockpuppet Corpus
We originally collected around 700 cases, but after man-
ual inspection we removed about 80 cases where editors
did not have content on the talk pages. These were editors
that just made contributions directly to Wikipedia pages but
did not engage in any side discussions about them. The re-
sulting corpus currently has 623 cases where 305 of them
Comment from the sockpuppeteer: -Inanna-
Mine was original and i have worked on it more than 4 hours.I have changed it many
times by opinions.Last one was accepted by all the users(except for khokhoi).I have
never used sockpuppets.Please dont care Khokhoi,Tombseye and Latinus.They are
changing all the articles about Turks.The most important and famous people are on
my picture.
Comment from the sockpuppet: Altau
Hello.I am trying to correct uncited numbers in Battle of Sarikamis and Crimean War
by resources but khoikhoi and tombseye always try to revert them.Could you explain
them there is no place for hatred and propagandas, please?
Comment from another editor: Khoikhoi
Actually, my version WAS the original image. Ask any other user. Inanna’s image was
uploaded later, and was snuck into the page by Inanna’s sockpuppet before the page got
protected. The image has been talked about, and people have rejected Inanna’s image
(see above).
Table 1: Sample excerpt from a single sockpuppet case. We show in boldface some of the stylistic features shared between
the sockpuppeter and the sockpuppet.
Confirmed SPI cases 305
Denied SPI cases 105
Created non-sock puppet cases 213
Average number of comments per case ∼ 180
Average number of comments per editors ∼ 83
Table 2: The sockpuppet data set
were confirmed SPI cases by Wikipedia administrators or
check users. The remaining 318 are non-sockpuppet cases
that combine 105 SPI cases where the administrators ver-
dict was negative, and 213 cases we created from other ed-
itors.
Examples from a couple of cases are shown in Table 1.
In that table we show a comment from the editor named
Inanna that was accused of being the puppeteer of editor
Altau. For comparison purposes we show as well a com-
ment made by another editor, not involved in the SPI case
on the same talk pages. A noticeable feature in the table is
the omission of a white space after the periods.
The table also shows that the comments resemble what we
would see in web forum data. For our corpus we found out
that the average length in characters is 529. While texts are
short, previous work has carried out author identification
from tweets (Layton et al., 2010), and many researchers,
ourselves included, have reached good prediction perfor-
mance on social media data that is very similar to the data
of this corpus. Some statistics about this dataset are shown
in Table 2.
6. A Machine Learning Approach to
Sockpuppet Detection
Earlier this year we did a case study of adapting a standard
machine-learning authorship attribution approach to predict
sockpuppet cases (Solorio et al., 2013). This preliminary
study shows some promising results for this task. But it
was based on a smaller set of cases, only 77. These 77
cases are a subset of the editors included in the new version
of the corpus.
Here we present new results using all 623 cases in a ten-
fold cross-validation setting. We hope these results can be
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Figure 1: The bars show average F-measures when testing
support vector machine removing one feature group at a
time in a 10 fold cross-validation setting.
used as a sort of baseline comparison for other researchers
using this data set.
For these experiments we also changed the underlying
framework for the task. Here we assume any pair of edi-
tors can be considered an instance of the classification prob-
lem, a SPI, and the learner has to decide whether to declare
the editors as belonging to the same person or not based
on observations from the comments made by each editor
involved. The features used in this problem are then the
pairwise normalized differences of the feature vectors rep-
resenting each comment. A complete list of features can be
found at the following link: https://www.dropbox.
com/s/15tztqd48jrbr2h/features.list and a
detailed description is in our previous paper (Solorio et al.,
2013). Figure 1 shows the results of training a support vec-
tor machine (SVM) classifier removing one feature group
at a time. We used Weka’s implementation of SVMs with
default parameters. The best results (F-measure 73%) are
achieved using all features. These results are very similar
to the results attained on our case study (F-measure 72%).
7. Conclusion
This paper presents a new dataset that will enable research
in authorship attribution under real-world adversarial con-
ditions. The nature of the data is very similar to what can
be found in social media, which makes it an even more at-
tractive resource as security and privacy concerns in social
media data will continue to grow. The prediction results re-
ported here will also be a good baseline for future research.
The data set will be available from the project website un-
der a Creative Commons license. Our goal is to continue
adding SPI cases on a regular basis to maintain an updated
resource.
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